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[History of Science, 46 (2008), pp. 1-48.] 
 
The touch of cold philosophy? 
At a Christmas dinner party in 1817 an admittedly drunken Charles Lamb berated the 
famed Isaac Newton as “a Fellow who believed nothing unless it was as clear as the 
three sides of a triangle.” He and John Keats then agreed that Newton had destroyed 
all the poetry of the rainbow, by reducing it to a prism.
1
 
Lamb and Keats, it seemed, wished Newton in hell, as William Blake had seemed to 
do earlier in his long poem Jerusalem (1804), where he blamed the “cogs tyrannic” of 
the newly industrializing Britain on the “Water-wheels of Newton” which drove the 
“Loom of Locke, whose woof rages dire”.2 Not long after this Christmas dinner party 
Keats made a public statement about Newton's “cold philosophy” in his poem, Lamia 
(1820): 
  Do not all charms fly 
At the mere touch of cold philosophy? 
There was an awful rainbow once in heaven: 
We know her woof, her texture; she is given 
In the dull catalogue of common things. 
Philosophy will clip an Angel's wings, 
Conquer all things by rule and line, 
Empty the haunted air, and gnomèd mine - 
Unweave a rainbow...
3
 
 But the Newton that Lamb, and Keats denounced, and whom Blake despised 
as a facet of the monstrous “Urizen”,4 was merely an image of what the previous age, 
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the “Age of Reason”, thought the great scientist should be like. It was an image of 
Newton that was the product of Voltaire and other admirers of Newton who saw him 
as a symbol of what human reason might achieve. The Enlightenment image of 
Newton, particularly in France, served ideological purposes. For Voltaire Newton's 
success did not simply derive from his mathematical acuity, his natural philosophy 
was in some way seen as a testament to the toleration, reason and good sense which 
prevailed among the English and which also provided them with an enviable political 
system. The Enlightenment image of Newton had little to do, therefore, with the man 
himself.
5
 
 If we take a closer look, however, at what we can reconstruct of Newton's 
actual beliefs about the nature of the rainbow, it seems hard to resist the feeling that 
Keats, Lamb and Blake might have been much more inclined to embrace his ideas. 
Indeed, the very fact that all of us raised in the British tradition believe that there are 
seven colours in the rainbow—which we try to remember by means of mnemonics 
like “Richard Of York Gave Battle In Vain”—owes more to Newton's belief in the 
harmonies of the world than it does to his reputed genius as an experimental scientist 
(or to the visible appearance of the rainbow—has anyone ever been able to see seven 
colours? Has anyone ever seen indigo in the spectrum?).
6
 
 Newton’s preoccupations become apparent when we look at his own account 
of his experimental discovery of the nature of the spectrum. In the Opticks, first 
published in 1704, he describes in detail how he came to distinguish the colours in the 
Rainbow. Having projected the spectrum from a prism on to a piece of paper, he 
called upon the aid of an assistant: 
I held the paper so that the spectrum might fall upon it, whilst an Assistant, 
whose eyes for distinguishing colours were more critical than mine, did by 
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Right Lines… drawn cross the Spectrum, note the Confines of the Colours, 
that is of the red…, of the orange…, of the yellow…, of the green…, of the 
blue…, of the indico…, and of the violet…. And this Operation being divers 
times repeated both in the same and in several Papers, I found that the 
observations agreed well enough with one another, and that the Rectilinear 
Sides [of the projected spectrum]… were by the said cross Lines divided after 
the manner of a Musical Chord.
7
 
It is this last comment which leads us deep into the notion of cosmic harmonies and 
Newton's belief in ancient Pythagorean wisdom. The seven colours of the rainbow, 
according to Newton, correspond to the seven notes of the octave, and they 
correspond so closely that the lines drawn across the spectrum by his supposed 
assistant are in precisely the same place you would need to bridge a monochord of 
corresponding length to give you each of the seven notes in the diatonic scale. The 
importance of this idea for Newton can be inferred, I think, from the fact that it 
appears in the Opticks essentially unchanged from the version which he had presented 
in his earliest public discussions of the nature of light in one of the papers delivered 
before the Royal Society of London in the mid-1670s.
8
 
 The immediate importance of the analogy between light and music for Newton 
was that it enabled him to answer an anticipated objection to his claim that colours 
were not, as all earlier natural philosophers insisted, modifications or even corruptions 
of pure, white, light, but that they were in fact, each one of them, the pure forms of 
light.
9
 If Newton's theory of light was true, it raised an obvious question for his 
contemporaries: Why might God have made the glorious light of the sun the mere 
result of a mixture of what, in the aethetics of the day, were the less glorious kinds of 
light seen typically through coloured glasses?
10
 Right from the outset Newton had a 
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ready answer. White sunlight should not be seen as a corrupt form of light made by a 
mixture of purer lights, it should be seen as the result of a superb harmony of the 
coloured lights shining in unison. Furthermore, it seems safe to say that it must have 
seemed obvious to Newton that if God had made sunlight in this way, then the colours 
would show some close similarities to the notes in the octave (and so, of course, there 
had to be seven). That Newton was predisposed towards this view becomes clear 
when we look at Newton’s first announcement of this idea, in the Optical Lectures 
which he delivered at Cambridge University from 1670. There is no mention of an 
assistant in this earlier account, and Newton admits that he could only distinguish five 
colours. Accordingly, he told his students, he added indigo and orange “in order to 
divide the image into parts more elegantly proportioned to one another”, and to make 
the analogy with the musical scale possible.
11
 
 It seems perfectly evident that underlying this aspect of Newton's thought was 
a belief in the essential truth of the ancient Pythagorean doctrine of cosmic harmony. 
Pythagoras was renowned as one of the greatest of the ancient sages, and as the first 
teacher of the concept of cosmic harmonies and of the importance of number and 
measure for a complete understanding of the world. We have direct evidence of 
Newton's familiarity with this ancient tradition from a number of remarkable 
manuscript passages, known as the “Classical scholia”, which he wrote for inclusion 
in an abandoned 2nd edition of the Principia mathematica. Here Newton intended to 
draw upon what was known of ancient Pythagorean doctrine to support his views on 
gravitational attraction. 
12
 
Until quite recently, the seriousness of such ideas in Newton’s thinking 
remained controversial. For those commentators who were more positivistically 
inclined, it was assumed that Newton could not have been serious about such dubious 
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historical claims, and the fact that they remained in manuscript, withheld from 
publication, was cited as evidence for his lack of commitment. We now know, 
however, that these ideas were bound up with a much greater project that Newton was 
engaged in, namely, his attempted reconstruction of the original religion before it 
became corrupted in the generations succeeding that of Noah and his sons. There can 
be no doubt of the seriousness with which Newton pursued these ideas.
13
  
 It is important to note that the link between the spectrum and the musical scale 
was not confined to Newton’s unpublished manuscripts. It cannot be argued, 
therefore, that Newton wasn’t serious about this idea and thought better of publishing 
it. As well as announcing it to the Royal Society in the 1670s, he published it in the 
highly influential Opticks. And yet, in spite of the unambiguously clear account of the 
analogy between the colours of the spectrum and the notes of the diatonic scale in the 
second of Newton’s two great books, it was evidently not an idea which resonated 
with Enlightenment natural philosophers. Newton’s affirmation of Pythagorean 
cosmic harmonies was soon forgotten and by the early nineteenth century Newtonian 
science could be disparaged by Keats (evidently speaking for others also) as coldly 
and unimaginatively unweaving the rainbow. Only in the second half of the twentieth 
century did scholars begin to correct the Enlightenment image of Newton and to 
recognize the more magical aspects of his work. The result of this on-going research 
is to acknowledge Newton as the “last of the magicians”, the “last wonder child to 
whom the Magi could do sincere and appropriate homage”.14 There can be little doubt 
that he was the last, or among the last. By the time of Newton’s death in 1727, the 
new reformed natural philosophy, which began to emerge in the sixteenth century and 
which had found its first programmatist in Francis Bacon, was sufficiently well 
established that its promoters saw it as sui generis, and felt no need to acknowledge 
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its parentage. But Newton was by no means the only natural philosopher who had 
drawn upon magical traditions. Indeed, Newton's own interest in various magical 
traditions can best be understood by locating it within a late-Renaissance movement 
to reform natural philosophy by paying closer attention to various magical or occult 
traditions.
15
  
 
Although it is now (at last) diminishing, there is still enormous resistance among the 
more positivist philosophers and historians of science to any suggestion that magic 
might have been instrumental in the emergence of modern science. It is remarkable, 
for example, that the authors of two recent books on the role of alchemy in the 
Scientific Revolution, one introductory the other advanced, both felt the need to 
justify the claims they were making on behalf of alchemy because of its “associations 
with magic and the occult”.16  For the most part, the arguments against the possible 
influence of magic on science are presented a priori, while the historical evidence is 
simply ignored. So, magic is characterized as irrational and its influence upon a 
supremely rational pursuit like modern science is easily dismissed as inherently 
implausible. Similarly, magic is said to be concerned with the supernatural and 
therefore could only be antithetical to mankind’s heroic intellectual endeavour to 
explain phenomena in entirely naturalistic terms.
17
 What is particularly unfortunate 
about this approach is that, by dismissing magic at the outset, it fails to put any effort 
into understanding the nature and significance of magic in the pre-modern and early 
modern periods. But this ahistorical approach is intellectual chauvinism of the most 
arrogant kind, and the result is undoubtedly a diminishing of our understanding of the 
origins of modern science.
18
 To carry on in this vein is to repeat the errors of Sir 
David Brewster, Isaac Newton’s first biographer. Taking the opportunity to scrutinize 
John Henry  Page 7 of 80 
Newton’s manuscript remains, Brewster soon came across the huge mass of 
alchemical manuscripts. His appalled response is well known: 
we cannot understand how a mind of such power, and so nobly occupied with 
the abstractions of geometry, and the study of the material world, could stoop 
to be even the copyist of the most contemptible alchemical poetry, and the 
annotator of a work, the obvious production of a fool and a knave.
19
 
When seen in the light of Brewster’s overwhelming admiration for Newton this is 
highly significant. An observer might have expected that Brewster would be led by 
his otherwise slavish veneration for his great forebear to conclude that, if Newton was 
so interested in alchemy, then there must have been something in it. But no, evidently 
Brewster’s conviction that alchemy was worthless rubbish outweighed even his awe 
of Newton’s genius. This paper, however, is based on the assumption that if many of 
the leading figures in the Scientific Revolution (undoubtedly among the leading 
thinkers of their age) drew upon magical traditions it is our job as historians to try to 
recover what it was that they saw in those traditions. In the process, we will not only 
learn more about the nature of magic in the Renaissance and in the early modern 
period, but also about the origins of modern science. 
 A positivistically inclined reader might be thinking at this point, however, that 
the fact that Newton’s musical analogy as a way of understanding the nature of light 
has been all but overlooked by succeeding generations of physicists (and so forgotten 
that even a romantic thinker like Keats was unaware of it) shows that it wasn’t of any 
real significance in the history of science. Knowledge of Newton’s belief in such 
matters is only a historical nicety, helping us to gain a more complete picture of 
“Newton, the man”, but of no relevance to our understanding of the historical 
development of science. In view of the fact that less than a hundred years after his 
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death Newton was found guilty of unweaving the rainbow, of removing its awfulness 
(in the sense of its ability to strike awe) and putting it in the “dull catalogue of 
common things”, this point perhaps should be conceded. But what about those other 
aspects of Newton’s physics which were also influenced by magical traditions? We 
cannot dismiss Newton’s belief in actions at a distance as equally irrelevant to the 
history of science. Although, in this particular case, it is interesting to note that 
Newton’s acceptance of actio in distans, clear as it is to see in his writings, has 
nonetheless been vigorously denied, firstly by scientists and then by historians of 
science.
 20
 
 The concept of actio in distans had been rejected by Aristotle and therefore 
excluded from mainstream natural philosophy from its beginnings in the Latin West 
in the twelfth century. It was always a prominent feature of the magical tradition, 
however, being a mainstay of notions of sympathy and antipathy, and therefore 
appearing in many of the occult arts and sciences, from astrology to alchemy and 
beyond. It is now generally acknowledged that Newton’s easy acceptance of actions at 
a distance (manifested most obviously in his concept of gravity, but also in the micro-
matter theory discussed in the “Queries” appended to the Opticks) derived from his 
own work in alchemy, where he can be seen to make assumptions about particles 
operating on one another across a distance.
21
 Furthermore, it cannot be denied that 
these ideas were immensely influential on succeeding generations of chemists and 
natural philosophers. The history of eighteenth-century natural philosophy, especially 
in Britain, can be seen in terms of those who accept the Newtonian claim that all 
phenomena can be explained in terms of attractive and repulsive forces operating 
between particles, or in terms of those who accept Newton’s idea that all phenomena 
might be explained by a highly rarefied yet highly transmissive aether, consisting of 
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particles widely separated as a result of strong repulsive forces operating between the 
particles.
22
 
 It seems perfectly clear from Newton’s example, therefore, that some aspects 
of the magical tradition were recognized by early modern thinkers as useful, and by 
implication, valid or true, while other aspects of the tradition were either ignored or 
rejected, and were by implication held to be invalid or false. The main aim of this 
article is to demonstrate that this was not just a feature of magical ideas as far as 
Newton was concerned, but was in fact the more general fate of the magical tradition. 
Some aspects of the tradition were taken up by practitioners and became absorbed into 
reformed versions of natural philosophy, while other aspects of the tradition were 
rejected.  
Indeed, it seems perfectly clear that something recognizably like modern 
science first emerged as a direct result of the absorption of various aspects of the 
magical tradition into traditional contemplative natural philosophy. Both the 
experimental method, and the concern that knowledge of the natural world should be 
put to use for the benefit of mankind, can be seen to have been long-established 
aspects of the magical tradition which came increasingly to be embraced by students 
of nature, who thereby turned traditional natural philosophy into one or other of the 
so-called new philosophies of the early modern period.
23
 It hardly seems necessary to 
repeat the arguments in support of this claim here. This does not mean, however, that 
there is nothing more to be said. If it is true that major aspects of the magical tradition 
became absorbed into what we might call (if we are allowed a bit of anachronistic 
leeway) modern science, then this has implications for claims that have been made 
about a perceived decline of magic at the end of the seventeenth century. The 
‘decline’ in question, of course, is the decline of magic as a topic for serious scholarly 
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investigation and discussion. While magical ideas continued to flourish in popular 
culture, they declined dramatically among the highly educated elite, and came to be 
regarded as well beyond the intellectual pale. The reasons for this are undoubtedly 
manifold, and a number of reasons for the decline have already been discussed, most 
notably, of course, in Keith Thomas’s Religion and the Decline of Magic.24 The aim 
of this paper is to suggest another major reason for the decline of magic; a reason 
which has not been discussed before, and which has significant implications for our 
understanding of early modern intellectual history. 
 
In the rest of this paper, therefore, I want to offer a new perspective to add to previous 
attempts to explain the so-called decline of magic. I suggest that there was a 
fragmentation of the occult arts and sciences during the Renaissance and early 
modern periods, as some aspects of the magic tradition became appropriated into the 
new philosophy, or new science. To a large extent it was the in-put from magic that 
made the new philosophies what they were, not only with regard to the experimental 
method and the new ethos that natural knowledge should be pragmatically useful, but 
also with regard to the substantive content of those new philosophies. At the same 
time, however, other aspects of the magical tradition were firmly rejected. These 
historical changes are perhaps best understood in terms of what sociologists of science 
have called ‘boundary work’, the process of demarcating supposed legitimate and 
valid procedures and presuppositions in establishing natural knowledge from those 
that are deemed invalid and illegitimate.
 25
 From the Renaissance through the period 
known as the Scientific Revolution there was a complete rearrangement of the 
boundaries of what was magic or occult and what was not, which in turn involved a 
redrawing of the boundaries which determined what was natural philosophy and what 
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was not. Furthermore, it is my contention that this led to a decline in the fortunes 
(among orthodox thinkers at least) of what was left behind in the realms of magic.  
 My account also helps us to see, therefore, what is in fact a major historical 
and historiographical irony. The reason why positivistically inclined commentators on 
the development of science have refused to acknowledge the relevance of magic to the 
history of science is because they mistake the rejected left-overs of the magical 
tradition—the pathetic rump of the tradition remaining after early modern natural 
philosophers had taken what they wanted from it—as the whole of the tradition. I said 
earlier that such historians, like Brewster confronted with Newton’s alchemy, refuse 
to make any attempt to understand the nature of the magical tradition. Just as 
Brewster, writing in the 1850s, knew the current reputation of alchemy and didn’t try 
to assess its reputation in Newton’s day, so certain modern commentators of science 
have relied upon their current understanding of what magic is (and by implication 
always has been), and have refused to accept the claims of other historians that magic 
was once so different that, properly understood, it is easy to see how it might have, 
and indeed did, influence the development of modern science. The currently 
prevailing conception of the magical tradition began to be forged in the eighteenth 
century and has continued into our own times, no less than the image of Newton as “a 
Fellow who believed nothing unless it was as clear as the three sides of a triangle”, 
began to be forged in the Enlightenment and has been reinforced ever since.
26
 
 Before proceeding it is important to note that I frequently talk here of a 
magical tradition as if there was indeed a unified tradition. This is in fact almost 
certainly not the case, and I am fully aware that I am imposing a unity on numerous 
different aspects of occult thinking in order to then say this unity is fragmented! I do 
this simply to make my overall argument clear and avoid tedious circumlocutions at 
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every turn. My argument by no means relies on the false claim that there was a unified 
tradition; on the contrary, I am arguing here that, during the Renaissance and in some 
cases persisting through to the late seventeenth century, various different ways of 
understanding natural phenomena which were excluded from mainstream scholastic 
natural philosophy, and which were all to some extent based on occult or magical 
assumptions, began to be considered more seriously by the learned, and were 
considered as possible ways of reforming the traditional natural philosophy which 
came to be seen as increasingly inadequate for a proper understanding of the natural 
world. My claim is not that the up-shot of these fresh looks at occult arts or sciences 
led natural philosophers to conclude that there was a unified tradition here which they 
then proceeded to break up. I simply wish to assert that some aspects of this diverse 
set of arts and sciences were seen as useful for contemporary reformist ambitions and 
were absorbed into natural philosophy, completely transforming that philosophy in the 
process, while other aspects were rejected. The fragmentation of Renaissance 
occultism should not be seen as similar to the fragmentation of western Christianity 
after the Reformation, therefore, because there was no previous occult tradition 
comparable in its monolithic nature to Roman Catholicism. My title should perhaps 
have indicated a discussion of the selective take-up of various occult arts and sciences 
and the rejection of others, but I hope the more succinct phrasing of the first part of 
my title is not too misleading. It fits in better, anyway, with the historiographically 
commonplace (and equally misleading) talk of the ‘decline of magic’.27 
 Having said that, let us begin by taking as broad an overview as we can of the 
nature of what I have called in my title ‘Renaissance occultism’ and its would-be 
practitioners. 
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The Nature of ‘Magic’ and of ‘Magicians’ 
One major reason for the prevailing mistaken conception (by positivist historians and 
others) of the nature of magic in the Renaissance is the lack of any understanding of 
what was known as natural magic. Lack of awareness of the natural magic tradition is 
due to the fact that it was to a large extent completely absorbed into what we now 
think of as science, while other, lesser, aspects of the tradition have remained in what 
should be regarded as merely a rump of the magical tradition—what was left over 
after parts of the tradition had been absorbed into natural philosophy. Today, we tend 
to identify magic with the supernatural (if we leave aside the stage trickery of ‘show-
business’ magic), but in the period we are looking at, to describe an event or a 
phenomenon as supernatural was to say that it had been brought about miraculously 
by God—only God was above nature, and only God could perform a supernatural 
act.
28
 Magic, by contrast, exploited the natural properties of things and the successful 
magician was believed to be highly knowledgeable about the different occult qualities 
of things. As Giovanni Battista Della Porta wrote: 
Magic is nothing else but the knowledge of the whole course of Nature. For 
whilst we consider the Heavens, the Stars, the Elements, how they are moved, 
and how they are changed, by this means we find out the hidden secrecies of 
living creatures, of plants, of metals, and of their generation and corruption; so 
that this whole science seems merely to depend upon the view of Nature... 
This Art, I say, is full of much vertue, of many secret mysteries; it openeth 
unto us the properties and qualities of hidden things, and the knowledge of the 
whole course of Nature; and it teacheth us by the agreement and the 
disagreement of things, either so to sunder them, or else to lay them so 
together by the mutual and fit applying of one thing to another, as thereby we 
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do strange works, such as the vulgar sort call miracles, and such as men can 
neither well conceive, nor sufficiently admire... Wherefore, as many of you as 
come to behold Magick, must be persuaded that the works of Magick are 
nothing else but the works of Nature, whose dutiful hand-maid magick is.
29
 
This definition appears in the most popular textbook of magic of its day, simply titled 
Magia naturalis (quoted from London edition of 1658, but first published in 1589), 
but the same claims about the nature of magic are repeated time and again. Cornelius 
Agrippa, a leading Renaissance contributor to the magical tradition, insisted that 
“magicians are careful explorers of nature only directing what nature has formerly 
prepared, uniting actives to passives and often succeeding in anticipating results so 
that these things are popularly held to be miracles when they are really no more than 
anticipations of natural operations”.30 
 The major assumption of natural magic, then, was that all bodies have occult 
qualities which make them capable of acting upon other bodies in various ways, 
though in many cases the working of these occult qualities are supposed to be highly 
specific. The main method of putting magical knowledge to use, therefore, is to bring 
together a body known to have a specific action and the body upon which it is known 
to act, or else to separate such reactants for a negative effect. This is what Della Porta 
meant by sundering or laying together things in accordance with their “agreement and 
disagreement”, and what Agrippa meant by “uniting actives to passives”. This 
doctrine made a major impression on the great reformer of natural philosophy, Francis 
Bacon, who stated it in the fourth Aphorism of his influential New Organon: 
“Towards the effecting of works, all that man can do is put together or part asunder 
natural bodies. The rest is done by nature working within.”31 Such occult interactions 
were often described in terms of sympathies and antipathies between bodies, a 
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notoriously magical way of talking which nevertheless was employed with minor 
changes by such leading exponents of the new philosophy as Robert Hooke, who 
spoke of congruities and incongruities between bodies, and Isaac Newton, who 
explained certain chemical phenomena in terms of principles of sociability and 
unsociability.
32
 
 When compared with natural magic other aspects of the tradition, aspects 
which today are all too often held to be characterizing features of magic, were 
distinctly subordinate. The truly learned magus was held to be a man (it was always a 
man of course
33
) with a vast knowledge of “how to effect things worthy of the highest 
admiration... by the mutual application of natural actives and passives”.34 The great 
magician, in other words, knew by experience many of the operations of the occult 
qualities of things and knew how to put that knowledge to use. Lesser magicians, 
however, might have to resort to one or other of two alternative aspects of the 
tradition, as a substitute for their lack of knowledge. Both of these aspects of the 
magical tradition were seen as means of cutting corners, or of taking a short cut, to the 
knowledge of the occult qualities which the real magus would learn by experience (in 
principle at least—though in practice more usually by relying on magical lore, 
increasingly printed magical lore).
 35
  
I am referring here to sorcery (which includes necromancy, theurgy, witchcraft 
and all other arts of summoning spiritual beings), and semeiology or symbolic magic 
(which relies upon the power of signs, words and other symbols, and includes 
numerology, gematria, spellbinding, incantation and so on). These are the very things 
which many think of today as definitive of magic, but this is largely thanks to the re-
drawing of boundaries which took place in the early modern period. In the pre-
modern period demonology and symbolic magic were seen primarily as subordinate to 
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natural magic. An important element of symbolic magic, for example, involved the 
reading of the ‘signatures’ of things. It was supposed that God, at the Creation, had 
left physical clues about the secret workings of things, these were the signatures. So, 
as one commentator wrote: “besides the manifest and occult qualities of plants, from 
which their uses may be inferred, [Nature] has marked those which are most useful to 
us with certain signs and characters”.36 God and Nature, after all, did nothing in vain, 
and so there must be a reason for every characteristic feature that a thing might have. 
A favourite example among historians is the walnut: crack open the shell and the flesh 
of the walnut resembles the human brain sitting in the skull, being divided down the 
middle and having a surface made up of convolutions. What else could this be but a 
sign from God that the walnut bears some relationship to the human head or brain?  
The usual assumption was that the signature indicated some curative power, and so 
walnuts were assumed to offer a cure, perhaps for headaches, or for mental 
disturbance. Needless to say, precise determination of the efficacy of walnuts would 
require empirical research of a trial and error kind. In this respect at least, then, 
symbolic magic can be seen as a short-cut to the knowledge of occult qualities 
required by the natural magician.
37
  
The link between natural magic and the signatures of things is easy to see, but 
to link sorcery to natural magic seems, on the face of it, bizarre in the extreme. 
Natural magic, as we've seen, in spite of its name, seems rather close to what we think 
of as science. It depends, after all, on the assumption that particular bodies have a 
power of interacting with others to create new bodies, or have a power of easing pain, 
curing specific diseases, and so on—assumptions which are no different from those of 
modern chemistry or pharmacology. Demonology, by contrast, seems to us to be 
completely divorced from any naturalistic conceptions. There is a lesson to be learned 
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here, however, about the astonishing flexibility of our cultural categories, and of our 
ability to redefine conceptual or disciplinary boundaries. 
 Surprising though it may seem, sorcery too was seen as little more than a way 
of avoiding the painstaking gathering of knowledge of occult qualities from 
experience. If we wish to understand this we must once again be aware of the shift in 
meaning of the notion of the ‘supernatural’. From our perspective it seems a 
reasonable assumption that for pre-modern thinkers demons were capable of 
performing supernatural acts to bring about some miraculous event. This fits our 
assumptions about demons. Our assumptions, however, are historically misguided. It 
is something of an irony that present-day notions of demons with comic-book 
superpowers (as seen on TV in Buffy the vampire slayer and other such shows) are the 
products of secular imaginations. In the pre-modern and early modern intellectual 
cosmology only God could do supernatural things. Demons, even the Devil himself, 
were God's creatures and as such were subject to natural law just like the rest of us.
38
 
As John Cotta wrote in The triall of witch-craft (1616): “Nature is nothing else but the 
ordinary power of God in all things created, among which the Divell being a creature, 
is contained, and therefore subject to that universal power”.39 In so far as the Devil 
could perform marvelous feats it was only by virtue of the fact that he was a 
consummate natural magician. The Devil knew the occult qualities of things, and how 
to apply appropriate actives to passives to accomplish whatever might be required. 
William Perkins put it rather well in his Discourse of the damned art of witch-craft 
(1618): 
[The Devil has] exquisite knowledge of all natural things, as of the influences 
of the starres, the constitutions of men and other creatures, the kinds, vertues, 
and operation of plantes, rootes, hearbes, stones etc., which knowledge of his 
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goeth many degrees beyond the skill of all men, yea even those that are most 
excellent in this kind, as Philosophers and Physicians are.
40
 
King James VI of Scotland likewise believed that the Devil was “farre cunningner 
then man in the knowledge of all the occult proprieties of nature”.41 Accordingly, if a 
would-be practitioner of natural magic was at a loss about how to accomplish a 
particular outcome he might indulge in necromancy to summon one of the dead, on 
the assumption that the dead person might know how to bring about the desired end.
42
 
The more ambitious magus, or one with a bigger problem might similarly decide to 
summon a demon, or even the Devil himself. It is important to note, however, that if 
the Devil did succeed in performing what the magus wanted it would be because, as 
William Perkins wrote: 
in nature there be some properties, causes, and effects... most familiar unto 
him [the Devil], because in themselves they be no wonders, but only mysteries 
and secrets, the vertue and effect whereof he hath sometime observed since his 
creation.
43
 
The Devil, in other words, does these things in the same way that the natural magician 
does, but with greater success because of his greater experience—the Devil, after all, 
has been around for a very long time. The vulgar might think that the Devil and the 
magus are capable of producing miracles, but, as Cornelius Agrippa insisted, both 
merely anticipate and exploit natural operations.
44
 “Demons operate nothing”, wrote 
Francesco Giuntini, “except by natural application of active forces to the appropriate 
and proportionate passive objects, which is the work of nature.”45 
 So, although the logic of symbolic magic and the logic of demonology were 
closely linked to the logic of natural magic in the pre-modern period, by the end of the 
sixteenth century a re-alignment was under way. By the end of the seventeenth 
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century major aspects of the natural magic tradition had been appropriated by the new 
philosophies or redefined in order to fit more easily with the new kinds of naturalism. 
But Symbolic magic, demonology and some aspects of natural magic, such as 
astrology, and the chrysopoeic aspects of alchemy, were left aside in what was 
effectively a new, differently defined, category of magic.  
 
An important aspect of the re-designation of natural magic as a set of assumptions that 
could be more fruitfully exploited in natural philosophy was, effectively, a denial that 
natural magic was magic. Thanks principally to the power of the Church, magic had 
always had what today would be called a ‘bad press’. As if the escapades of frauds 
and charlatans claiming to be alchemists, astrologers, and magicians were not enough 
to damage the reputation of magic, the Roman Catholic Church tended to emphasize 
its demonological aspects in order to present it as dangerous and irreligious. It seems 
clear that the Church wanted to avoid confusion between the miraculous and the kind 
of marvellous things which were achievable through natural though occult means. 
Natural magic seemed to suggest, to the uneducated at least, that miraculous things 
could be accomplished by laymen without supernatural aid. This implicit threat to the 
authority of the Church could be neatly turned around by insisting that all magic was 
accomplished by demonic aid, and so condemning it in the most vigorous terms. For 
the Church, every magus was a Doctor Faustus (and during the witch-crazes every 
village ‘cunning man’ or more especially ‘cunning woman’ was accused of deriving 
their knowledge not from local lore but directly from Satan).
46
 It is this attitude of the 
Church which underlies the comments we have already seen, in which Della Porta, 
Agrippa, and others insist that magic is merely the study of nature and so, by 
implication, no more dangerous to the faith than natural philosophy. 
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It is hardly surprising, therefore, that although we come across many reputed 
magicians in the historical record, we do not come across many who declare 
themselves to be magicians; on the contrary, they usually deny it. Nobody was reputed 
a greater magician than Roger Bacon and yet Bacon himself vigorously denied that he 
did anything by magic. If we were to take Bacon, and other magicians in denial, at 
their word, however, we might have to conclude that there was no such thing as a 
magical tradition, and that nobody ever was a magician. In a sense the latter is true, 
because there never was a Merlin, or a Faust, there were only mathematicians, 
alchemists, cabbalists, natural philosophers of a more mystical bent than usual, 
humanist scholars enthralled by Neoplatonic theurgy, and so forth.
47
 But we need to 
bear in mind the historical actors’ categories, not our own. From the point of view of 
his contemporaries, Roger Bacon was, as the late George Molland pointed out, “a full-
blooded magician”, and in Molland’s estimation this was hardly surprising since, in 
spite of his protestations to the contrary, Bacon “went some way to meriting his later 
classification as a magician”.48   
As a result of religious condemnation of magic, then, it wasn’t possible simply 
to appropriate occult traditions in an open way into natural philosophy. Accordingly, 
an important aspect of the absorption of natural magic into reformed versions of 
natural philosophy was the defense of those past thinkers who were alleged to be 
magicians from all charges that they were magicians. Again, as George Molland has 
pointed out, reputed medieval magicians like Al-Kindi, Albertus Magnus, Roger 
Bacon, Arnald of Villanova and Michael Scot were transformed in early modern 
scholarly literature from magicians into heroes of experimental science. The major 
contribution to this new enterprise was Gabriel Naudé’s Apologie pour tous les 
Grands Personages qui ont esté faussement soupçonnez de Magie (Paris, 1625), but 
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John Dee, evidently defended Roger Bacon, in a work now lost, from charges of 
sorcery.
49
 Similarly, Robert Hooke later took it upon himself to defend Dee. Having 
acquired increased notoriety from a newly published account of his supposed 
converse with various angels, Dee was defended by Hooke as a cryptographer rather 
than a sorcerer. According to Hooke, these angelic conversations were in fact a 
“concealed History of Nature and Art”. In taking this line, Hooke was simply re-using 
the same defense which had been used to protect the reputation of Johannes 
Trithemius—another magus who reported his conversations with angels, but which 
were later claimed to be merely exercises in cryptography (the point of the exercises 
being to find what was really being said under the guise of these conversations with 
angels).
 50
  
Other exploiters of the magical tradition chose to obscure their indebtedness to 
the tradition, or to confuse contemporaries as to their commitment to magic. Francis 
Bacon vigorously criticised magic even as he appropriated many of its precepts and 
doctrines.
51
 Cornelius Agrippa made the status of his De occulta philosophia 
(Cologne, 1533) somewhat ambiguous by publishing what looked like a retraction of 
it three years before publishing the work itself (although the supposed retraction, De 
incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum, has recently been shown to be far from 
straightforward).
52
 Isaac Newton would never have declared himself to be the last of 
the magi, but it is significant that he responded to Leibniz’s charge that his principle 
of gravity was a “scholastic occult quality” not by denying that it was occult, but by 
denying that it was ‘scholastic’, which is what he meant by rejecting occult qualities 
which were supposed to depend upon specific forms: 
These Principles [gravity and other “active principles” in matter] I consider, 
not as occult Qualities, supposed to result from the specifick Forms of Things, 
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but as general Laws of Nature, by which the Things themselves are form’d; 
their Truth appearing to us by Phaenomena, though their Causes be not yet 
discover’d. For these are manifest Qualities, and their Causes only are 
occult.
53
 
Although Newton wants to rhetorically present the obvious fact that bodies fall to the 
ground as ‘manifest’, gravity was never a manifest quality in the scholastic sense, if 
its causes were occult then it was occult. Newton knew this, just as he knew that the 
actions at a distance he invoked in the Queries at the end of the Opticks, and in the 
Preface to the Principia, were as much a part of the magical tradition as the alchemy 
he had so fervently pursued.
54
 
Neither silence about magical influence, nor even explicit denial of magic, 
should be taken as evidence that magical traditions did not play a role in the origins of 
modern science. We need to be constantly aware of the process which sociologists of 
science refer to as ‘boundary-drawing’. As we shall see, early modern thinkers re-
constituted symbolic magic as beyond the intellectual pale, for example, while 
continuing to accept natural magic; others reasserted the untenability of sorcery 
(whether on sceptical or religious grounds
55
), while claiming other facets of the 
magical tradition as defining aspects of natural philosophy. Those positivistic 
historians and philosophers of science who have regarded magic as antithetical to 
science have made the mistake, in my view, of neglecting such changes in what 
constituted magic. They have tended to assume that magic in the early modern period 
was essentially the same as it is now. In fact, magic has changed radically. Chiefly 
because significant parts of the original tradition have been absorbed into natural 
philosophy, and redefined by the historical actors themselves (all too conscious of 
religious opposition to magic) as though they were always aspects of natural 
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philosophy or other legitimate attempts to understand the natural world.
56
 I disagree, 
therefore, with the suggestion of Frank L. Borchardt that, sooner or later, magicians 
themselves expressed a “disappointment in magic”, recognising that it led inexorably 
to demonolatry, and repudiated it as they all turned back to religious orthodoxy. It 
seems to me that the story is rather one of negotiating with the faith, their own as 
much as that of leading Churchmen, and appropriating certain aspects of magic into 
their own philosophical systems, while leaving the more religiously dangerous aspects 
to remain in what became an increasingly demonologically defined (as opposed to the 
former more naturally defined) magic.
57
 One of the major reasons why the influence 
of magic on science (if we can speak anachronistically for the sake of a 
historiographical argument) has been denied is precisely because those aspects of 
magic which clearly did influence science are now simply regarded as part of the 
history of science, and so no longer recognized to be part of the history of magic. 
Meanwhile, those aspects of magic which were not absorbed into science, and to a 
large extent were seen in the early modern period as antithetical to a proper 
understanding of natural phenomena, have come to be regarded as entirely 
representative of magic, not just as it was after the end of the seventeenth century, but 
as it was throughout the whole of its career through Western culture. This is simply a 
very misleading mistake. 
 
Clipping Angels’ Wings: The Changing Status of Demonology 
The separation of natural magic from demonic magic is such an important part of this 
story that is worth considering the background in more detail. We have suggested that 
natural magic and demonology were always closely linked, so why didn’t these 
linkages persist after the absorption of various aspects of the magical tradition into the 
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new philosophies? After all, we do know that the various new philosophies continued 
to be closely affiliated to religion,
 58
 and so we might expect to see the precepts of 
demonology being carried over into the new philosophies.
59
 As Stuart Clark has 
shown, however, it is possible to see why demonology was separated from both 
natural magic and natural philosophy in the early modern period, in spite of (or maybe 
even because of) the otherwise friendly relations between science and religion. In 
what follows, I rely entirely upon Clark’s analysis. 
 The sixteenth century was, of course, a period of intense religious turmoil, not 
only by virtue of the factionalism of the Reformation, but also as a result of major 
efforts (not unconnected) to increase the levels of spirituality and religious observance 
among the laity. It was almost inevitable in this atmosphere that the detailed scrutiny 
of what occult qualities can and cannot do in natural philosophy was bound to have 
repercussions in demonology. Particularly as this was also the age of the witch 
craze.
60
 
 Since accusations of witchcraft always began with notions of occult 
influence—the evil eye, or laying a curse or some such—it became important for the 
demonologist to be able to distinguish between what was a natural effect and what 
was not. If a villager was able to make a neighbour's milk-cow go dry by natural, even 
though occult, means, the Church, in principle at least, would not be so concerned 
about it (because it could be regarded as simply a criminal matter, equivalent to an 
assault, and a matter for the secular courts). The Church’s main concern was with 
those who were believed to have made a pact, a bargain, with the Devil. Accordingly, 
it was important to be able to distinguish what could be accomplished without 
demonic aid, from what could not. The decision as to whether a particular 
malfeasance was brought about by natural or unnatural means depended of course 
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upon what could be said to be natural (even though occult). This does not mean, 
however, that demonologists had now departed with tradition and orthodoxy and had 
decided that the Devil could, after all, perform supernatural phenomena (remember, 
we saw earlier that the pre-modern view was that the Devil could not do anything 
supernatural but could only exploit his knowledge of natural magic). No, the 
unanimous assumption was still that the Devil could only perform his deeds by natural 
means, but that he was so clever at exploiting occult qualities, that he could deceive 
onlookers into mistaking just how a particular accomplishment was achieved. The 
witch might have thought that covering herself with an ointment made from the fat of 
birds enabled her to fly, but in fact the Devil enabled her to fly by some other natural 
means, or more likely, simply used natural means to give the witch the illusion of 
flying (the ointment, in other words, was not an anti-gravity substance, but merely a 
hallucinogen). In this case, following Thomas Aquinas, the theologian will argue that 
the ointment is effectively a sign of the witch's compact with the Devil.
61
 
 So, natural philosophers and theologians were both concerned to decide what 
was natural and what was not. Needless to say, there were numerous disputes. The up-
shot, in demonology, was that if an effect was brought about by spurious means, that 
is to say, by means which could not be shown to bring about that effect in a natural 
way, then the conclusion was that the devil was affecting the outcome, and so the 
human agent was guilty of a satanic pact. A witch charged with poisoning a neighbour 
who said she had administered the poison by contaminating his well, would be 
considered differently from one who said she had walked through his wall and 
dropped the poison into his mouth as he slept. The Devil, being a spirit, can walk 
through walls, but he cannot arrange for a human being to walk through a wall. He 
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can, however, make the witch believe she has walked through a wall, but if she did 
believe that then she is guilty of colluding with the Devil in some way.  
This aspect of demonology was not confined to witch trials, nor to those 
occasions when an accused was supposedly successful in bringing about a magical 
outcome. It is easy to see that for the Churchman concerned to improve the general 
spirituality of his flock, even a false belief that a charm, or a particular incantation, or 
even a particular herb, will bring about a desired outcome, is a sign of lack of trust in 
God. Popular beliefs about the efficacy of various techniques and rituals for bringing 
about good health or good fortune, for foretelling the future, or for making the right 
decision, ignored the divine aspect of Providence and all that went with it (such as an 
awareness of the need for prayer and repentance). It seemed to the theologian to be at 
best an idolatry, placing faith in God's creatures rather than God himself, and at worst 
to be a form of paying homage to the Devil—since these procedures are not thought to 
work by natural means, the persons who perform them must expect the Devil to 
intercede for them.
62
 
 In this way, then, demonology extended itself to embrace the study of 
superstition. But superstition at this time was regarded by Churchmen with great 
seriousness; like witchcraft it was seen as “religion's opposite”, and it therefore 
became of the utmost importance to eradicate or to suppress the superstitious magic of 
popular culture. We can't pursue here the various ways in which the Church tried 
(often unsuccessfully) to eradicate popular magical beliefs, but it is important for us to 
note that one essential ingredient in all such efforts was an insistence upon the 
spuriousness of the causal links between the supposed magical procedure and the 
desired outcome. Churchmen were concerned, therefore, first of all to understand the 
real causal linkages available in nature (even if they may be occult) and secondly to 
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use that knowledge to draw a clear distinction between legitimate natural philosophy 
and illicit magic. The category of magic was again redefined in this process; the 
intellectual boundaries around it redrawn. For Churchmen, magic became 
interchangeable with witchcraft and superstition, all being seen as attempts to use the 
power of the devil to bring about a desired outcome.
63
 The appalling enthusiasm with 
which Churchmen redefined magic—changing it from a knowledge of the natural 
powers of things to a commerce with the Devil—provided the intellectual 
underpinning for the European witch-crazes.
64
 Such religious excesses made it all the 
more important for those natural philosophers who recognized the usefulness of the 
magical tradition to extract what they needed from that tradition and to incorporate it 
into the safe intellectual haven of natural philosophy, denying that it had anything to 
do with magic. Here again, we can see that what was left behind by the new 
philosophers, what was not taken up by them and incorporated into natural 
philosophy, was in fact just a patchwork of the earlier magical tradition, but it soon 
came to be seen as the full picture.  
It can be seen, then, that the Churches were vigorously re-asserting what had 
always been their dominant view, that all magic is sorcery, at the same time that 
natural philosophers were absorbing much of the tradition of natural magic into their 
new philosophies. The result was a major shift in perceptions of what was magic and 
what was not. But such a sea-change in the categorization of magic did not take place 
at the throwing of a switch. Clearly it was a rather more piecemeal, and complex 
process than I’ve been able to indicate here. Throughout the second half of the 
seventeenth century, on the eve of the Enlightenment, it was still possible for a natural 
philosopher like Boyle, or Newton (or any number of others) to draw upon the old 
natural magic tradition to provide them with theories of matter, or methodological 
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justifications for occultist explanations, and they can clearly be seen to have done so. 
It was no longer possible, however, for them to speak meaningfully about the 
importance of the magical tradition in their work: even by then such a pronouncement 
would have been misunderstood. Here, for example, we can discern a clear difference 
between Boyle and Newton on the one hand, and Francis Bacon on the other. Bacon, 
writing at the beginning of the century, could explicitly discuss the validity of magic, 
or simply invoke precepts which he overtly affirmed to be appropriated from the 
magical tradition, but Boyle and Newton never did this. 
This is not to say that Boyle, Newton and others at the end of the seventeenth 
century would have self-consciously kept quiet about their indebtedness to the magical 
tradition—using it, but deliberately avoiding any acknowledgement that they were 
using it for fear of the Church. That’s not how the social process of re-defining 
disciplinary boundaries works. Participating in the boundary-drawing process 
themselves, Boyle and his contemporaries almost certainly would have simply denied 
magical influence (as Roger Bacon had done centuries before). Boyle himself, we 
know, was highly troubled in his conscience by his attempts to succeed at the old 
alchemical dream of transmuting lead into gold. Shortly before his death Boyle 
consulted his close friend Gilbert Burnet, Bishop of Salisbury, for advice and 
reassurance on some matters that troubled his conscience. Burnet took a record of the 
discussion and Michael Hunter has recently analyzed these notes.
65
 It is important to 
realize that the discussion between Boyle and Burnet does not involve concerns about 
the matter theory of alchemy, nor are there any doubts that alchemical transmutation 
is possible. What does concern Boyle, however, is the fact that every successful 
transmutation which Boyle knew about, including one he allegedly performed 
himself, were brought about by the use of a ready-made powder which came from a 
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mysterious source. If such an alchemical powder had been made by Boyle himself, he 
could be sure that it was produced by natural means. There was an obvious danger 
however if the ready-made powder was simply given to him (as indeed it was)—the 
powder might not be a natural cause of transmutation but merely a sign from the 
Devil. Perhaps alchemical transmutation has only ever succeeded with the help of the 
Devil, whom even Boyle unwittingly invoked when he used the powder given to him 
by a stranger.
66
 
 Hunter provides us with another example. This time told by John Flamsteed, 
first Astronomer Royal. A local Greenwich washerwoman who had had a parcel of 
linen stolen asked Flamsteed if he could tell her where it was by divination (note that 
she saw no distinction between an astronomer and an astrologer). Flamsteed was 
evidently in a flippant mood and he drew circles and squares at his desk before telling 
her where she might find the linen. You can no doubt guess what happened. She did 
find the linen exactly where Flamsteed said it would be. She returned to the Royal 
Observatory to give Flamsteed half a crown, but Flamsteed was horrified: 
Good woman, I am heartily glad you have found your Linen; but I assure you I 
know nothing of it, and intended only to joke with you… But I see the Devil 
has in mind I should deal with him: I am determined I will not. Never come or 
send any one to me any more, on such Occasions, for I will never attempt such 
an Affair again while I live.
67
 
It seems clear from these stories that the new concept of magic, as the locus of activity 
for the Devil, was gaining ground with natural philosophers as well as theologians. It 
does not follow, however, that these natural philosophers rejected the possibility of 
transmuting lead into gold by natural means, much less all the other occult 
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phenomena which until recently had been routinely seen as part of the natural magical 
tradition. 
If what was left of magic became increasingly identified with superstition 
throughout the seventeenth century, it was forced to undergo another shift in the 
eighteenth century. The intellectual leaders of the succeeding age, the would-be “Age 
of Reason”, had their own agenda, and their own very different reasons for dismissing 
all superstition, and in their case, all serious talk of demons. In that further shift, 
during the Enlightenment, the old idea that demons (thanks to the long experience 
they gained as immortals) were merely adepts of natural magic was completely lost. 
The secularists of the Enlightenment tended on the one hand to imagine that those 
benighted individuals who believed in demons believed them to be supernatural 
beings, while on the other hand they were hardly aware of the tradition of natural 
magic, since much of it had by then become absorbed into the new philosophies.  
 
The Selective Absorption of Aspects of the Magical Tradition 
The foregoing should not be taken to mean that natural philosophers simply decided 
in a deliberate way to look into the magical tradition to see if there was anything they 
could incorporate into their natural philosophies. This was no more the case than that 
natural philosophers in the sixteenth century deliberately decided to go and see what 
artisans and craftsmen were doing, on the chance there might be something they could 
use. Nevertheless, it is just as true to say that natural philosophers began to become 
more and more familiar with occult arts and sciences as it is to say that scholars and 
craftsmen began to interact during the Renaissance as they never had before.
68
 In 
some cases, of course, reformers did extol the deliberate appropriation of knowledge 
from craft or magical traditions, and no doubt some of their readers did follow suit. 
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Certainly, Juan Luis Vives did urge his scholarly readers in 1531 “to enter into shops 
and factories, and to ask questions from craftsmen, and to get to know about the 
details of their work”; and Francis Bacon urged readers of his Novum organum (1620) 
to systematically search through magical lore,  
for although such things lie buried deep beneath a mass of falsehood and fable, 
yet they should be looked into… for it may be that in some of them natural 
operations lie at the bottom; as in fascination, strengthening of the 
imagination, sympathy of things at a distance, transmission of impressions 
from spirit to spirit no less than from body to body and the like.
69
  
For the most part, however, what we are dealing with is a diffuse movement, 
throughout Europe and spread over the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, of 
thinkers adopting, or adapting, theories, assumptions, and techniques which 
previously would have been seen as too occult or too susceptible to the charge of 
being demonic, into what came to be accepted as the new philosophy. Again, different 
aspects of this diffuse movement, need to be understood differently. William Gilbert, 
who developed an explanation of the perpetual movement of the Earth (demanded by 
Copernican theory) based on the occult properties of magnets, may not have been 
looking for a way to explain the motion of the Earth, but realized he could offer an 
explanation after reading Maricourt’s Epistle on the Magnet. Robert Boyle did not 
turn to alchemy as a result of his dissatisfaction with Cartesian mechanical 
philosophy—he already was an alchemist, and may well have recognized 
inadequacies in Cartesianism precisely because of his alchemical knowledge.
70
 In lots 
of different ways magical ideas became incorporated into the mainstream of 
philosophical thought, but only in a few cases was this the result of a self-conscious 
effort to plunder magical traditions. 
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The precise way in which different areas of the occult arts and sciences were 
taken up by natural philosophers can be seen, therefore, to be complex and affected by 
many historical contingencies. It is not possible to provide a model which reveals how 
the occult was absorbed into mainstream philosophy because each case was very 
different. The process was not systematic, and may not even have been fully 
comprehensive, embracing every aspect of the occult, but it was undeniably extensive. 
What follows in this section is not intended to be a complete account, but merely a 
preliminary attempt to show how aspects of at least some of the occult sciences came 
to be incorporated into the new philosophies of the early modern period, while others 
were considered for inclusion but ultimately rejected. 
So-called mathematical magic, for example, was concerned with the 
demonstration of what could be accomplished by machinery. Machines, after all, were 
intended to perform marvellous feats which could not be done by normal means, and 
they did so in ways that were by no means manifest to a casual observer. Their 
operations were, therefore, by definition occult. In part this can be seen as an example 
of Arthur C. Clarke’s ‘law’, that “any sufficiently advanced technology is 
indistinguishable from magic”. But it would be a mistake to assume that this meant 
that Renaissance thinkers believed that machinery was worked by hidden demons.
71
 
The ill-educated were superstitious, of course, and sometimes might well have 
thought this way, but among the educated it was perfectly well known that machines 
worked by means of cunningly arranged mechanical contrivances. Consider, for 
example, Salluste du Bartas’s description of the “iron fly”, allegedly built by the 
mathematician Regiomontanus and capable of flying around a room:  
O devine wit, that in the narrow wombe 
Of a small Flie, could finde sufficient roome 
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For all those springs, wheels, counterpoise, & chaines, 
Which stood in stead of life, and spurre, and raines.
72
 
This iron fly would still have been held to work by occult means. Because the 
mechanical arrangements which “stood in stead of life” were hidden, and their mode 
of operation was not obvious to the senses, and moreover could not be explained in 
the terms of Aristotelian natural philosophy, they were regarded as occult powers, 
analogous to the workings of occult qualities in natural bodies.
73
  
 The mathematisation of the world picture has always been regarded as an 
important element in the Scientific Revolution, but scholarly analysis of this crucial 
historical process has failed to pay sufficient attention to the undeniable associations 
between mathematics and magic in the Renaissance. Historians of mathematics have 
looked to humanists, astronomers, Jesuit mathematicians, and mathematical 
practitioners of the more pragmatic kind (artillerymen, surveyors, merchant book-
keepers, and engineers of various kinds), but have largely ignored those Renaissance 
intellectuals who were more concerned with the magic of mathematics.
74
 This is 
undoubtedly another result of the positivist tendencies among historians of science, 
tending to dismiss anything which smacks of magic. Where magical mathematics has 
been discussed it has been seen purely as an aspect of Renaissance culture, and its 
possible relevance to the subsequent development of mathematics is left 
unconsidered. J. Peter Zetterberg, for example, takes it for granted that there was 
something called ‘the mathematicks’ which was unfortunately all too often mistaken 
for magic. It evidently never occurred to him that mathematics could have been, as 
indeed it was, regarded by pre-modern thinkers as a major part of the magical 
tradition.
75
 As far as most pre-modern thinkers were concerned, to describe a man as a 
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mathematician was to describe him as a wizard; this was certainly true, for example, 
in the cases of John Napier and John Dee.
76
 
 By the time John Wilkins, one of the major contributors to the new philosophy 
in England, came to publish his Mathematical magick (1648), he felt it necessary to 
apologize for the title. By now, educated men were getting used to the idea that 
mathematics had an important place in natural philosophy (something which had 
always been denied by Aristotle), and mechanics was increasingly being seen as a 
science which depended upon natural phenomena, and so the workings of machinery 
could be seen as part of natural philosophy, and could shake off its old association 
with magic.
77
 The process of incorporating mechanics into natural philosophy began 
with the Renaissance discovery of the Mechanical questions, attributed (wrongly) to 
Aristotle and first translated into Latin by Vittore Fausto in 1517. It required the re-
casting of mechanics from an art to one of the mixed mathematical sciences, before 
Descartes could insist, in 1644, that “there really are no reasonings in Mechanics 
which do not also pertain to Physics, of which it is a part or species.”78 Undoubtedly 
one of the most important contributors to this transformation in attitudes to mechanics 
was Girolamo Cardano, a mathematician who was prominent in the occult tradition.  
 Cardano has still not attracted the scholarly attention he undoubtedly deserves 
and so his historical importance has yet to be properly assessed. It is clear, however, 
that his “complete account of the universe in a single volume”, De subtilitate (1550), 
is one of the earliest attempts to provide a comprehensive system of philosophy 
intended as a substitute for the Aristotelian system. One of the striking features of this 
work, most evident in its opening book on the principles of natural philosophy, is the 
way Cardano easily moves back and forth between explaining natural phenomena and 
the way machines work. Indeed, he uses his accounts of machinery to explain the 
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principles of natural motion, matter, the void, and so forth.
79
 This approach, mixing 
the natural and the artificial, together with his emphasis in his mathematical works on 
the relevance of mathematics to the understanding of nature, is radically different 
from the traditional Aristotelian approach but contributed strongly to the 
“epistemological optimism with emphasis on the utility of knowledge” which the 
historian of mathematics, Jens Høyrup, has seen as characteristic of Renaissance 
occultism.
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 Although historians of mathematics have tended to be even less interested in 
assessing the possible influence of occultism than historians of science have been, 
there seems to be a prima facie case for assuming that changing attitudes to 
mathematics, and changes in the intellectual status of mathematics, owed something 
to the reassessment of occult traditions which took place during the Renaissance. 
There is even a case to be made for the role of numerology in the Scientific 
Revolution, albeit a case that hinges almost entirely on Kepler and Newton. In the so-
called ‘Classical scholia’, in which Newton sought support for universal gravitation in 
Pythagorean doctrine, he seemed to take seriously the belief that the number seven 
has some cosmic significance—as revealed by its appearance in music, optics, and the 
number of heavenly bodies in our system. These facts of nature, together with what 
Newton thought of as clear historical evidence of the significance of the number seven 
in ancient wisdom (that is to say, wisdom closer in time to that of Adam), revealed 
something about the mind of God.
81
 Similarly, Kepler was at least as much concerned 
to know why God only created seven heavenly bodies in our system, as he was to 
understand what force actually moved the planets. Johannes Kepler believed that he 
had found a natural explanation for the fact that God only created six planets (instead 
of 10, 100, or even an infinite number) to circle the Sun in the details of what he 
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called the geometrical archetype.
82
 It is important to note, however, that for both 
Kepler and Newton numerology had to be firmly grounded on empirical facts about 
the physical world. This set their numerology apart from those whose opinions about 
what a particular number might signify were based on mysterious traditions, or their 
own whims. This is precisely why Kepler objected so vigorously to the writings of 
Robert Fludd, and tried to ensure that his own work was not seen in the same light as 
Fludd’s. Kepler found numerical significances in the Creation, while Fludd found 
them in his own imagination and imposed them on the natural world (at least, this is 
how Kepler saw the situation).
 83
 
 It might be suggested that the latter kind of numerologist was the more 
common, and so Neoplatonising fantasists like Robert Fludd, for example, are more 
representative than Kepler or Newton. But this could easily be an illusion created by 
the prevailing historiography (or perhaps by the lack of an adequate historiography). 
Although Kepler’s geometrical archetype is well known, it isn’t always stressed in the 
literature that his deployment of the five Platonic solids in between the planetary 
spheres enabled him to answer the question as to why God only created six planets 
(the point being that, if God spaced the planets between these solids, He had to stop at 
six because He’d run out of solids, and the rules of geometry make it clear that not 
even God could create a sixth regular solid). Similarly, although Newton’s analogy 
between the colours in the spectrum and the notes in the octave are plain for all to see 
in the Opticks, it is hardly ever mentioned, even in scholarly works dealing with 
Newton’s optical theories. It is perfectly possible, therefore, that numerological 
concerns which are closer to Kepler’s and Newton’s than to Fludd’s are waiting to be 
found in the writings of other contributors  to the historical development of science.  
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 The entirely undeniable role of alchemy in the development of modern science 
also needs to be understood in a carefully nuanced way. In an important article 
Lawrence Principe and William Newman have recently shown that our modern view 
of the nature of alchemy is severely distorted by various reconstructions of it which 
derive from nineteenth-century occultist movements, and have no real historical basis 
in the alchemy of the pre-modern period.
84
 The historiographical rot set in when 
Enlightenment thinkers drew a spurious distinction between chemistry, in something 
like the modern sense, and alchemy, which was presented as being concerned solely 
with transmutation of base metal into gold.
85
 This in itself can be seen as part of the 
trend, still active in the eighteenth century, to separate the new natural philosophy 
from magic. The need for this kind of separation of alchemy from chemistry became 
even more urgent for later spokesmen on science because of what Principe and 
Newman see as three “residues of Victorian occultism”.86 Firstly, “spiritual alchemy”, 
which extended Jacob Boehme’s ecstatic use of alchemical imagery in his religion of 
self-purification and self-transmutation, implied that all alchemy was to be understood 
in this kind of mystical light. This view of alchemy was in turn transformed on the 
one hand into an exclusive concern with psychic transformation by the psychologist 
Carl Jung; and on the other into what they call a “panpsychic interpretation” of 
alchemy (in which alchemy was equated with an organic, vitalist, and generally 
enchanted worldview which was, so the story continued, inimical to modern science) 
by the doyen of comparative religious studies, Mircea Eliade. Newman and Principe 
are in the forefront of on-going efforts to recover the real history of alchemy from 
these obfuscations, and to show precisely how alchemy was absorbed into modern 
science, and what was left out (or, in this case, what came to be interpolated 
subsequently into the bogus history of alchemy). In connection with this, Principe and 
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Newman point out that not all alchemists subscribed to an animist, or even a vitalist, 
view of matter, and that such differences might have resulted in a different kind of 
take-up of alchemical ideas by reforming natural philosophers. Similarly, they point to 
recent work which has shown that alchemical matter theory was often corpuscularian, 
and even mechanistic, and which certainly played a part in the new matter theories of 
the Scientific Revolution.
87
 
 If alchemy was broken down into a general concern with chemical interactions 
and processes on the one hand and a concern with metallic transmutation on the other, 
and only the former made it into the new science, we can see a similar process with 
regard to the absorption of herbalism and the lore of Medieval bestiaries. Studies of 
flora and fauna in the pre-modern period were overlaid with assumptions about the 
religious, moral and symbolic significance of all God’s creatures, as well as their 
potential for providing materia medica. Many of these assumptions, in what historians 
have referred to as the “emblematic worldview”, derived from the belief in 
correspondences within the Great Chain of Being, and included various occult 
associations, based upon what were considered to be God-given signatures. As botany 
and zoology came to be included in the new science, however, much of this magical 
and mythological lore, once considered to provide essential information about the 
plant or animal in question, was excluded.  
To understand this change in attitude about knowledge of natural things, we 
need to consider the effect of the discovery of the new world. Plants and animals from 
the new world came to the West devoid of any symbolic associations—they had no 
religious or moral significance deriving from either historical and religious legends, or 
from humbler folklore. Naturalists had no choice but to confine themselves to known 
facts about this new flora and fauna. In subsequent compendiums of natural history, 
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therefore, there was a clear shift towards treating all plants and animals in the same 
strictly descriptive way. Just as creatures unknown to European culture had to be 
recorded merely in terms of what could actually be observed, so the old folkloric 
associations were stripped away from familiar plants and animals. To a large extent 
this resulted in a less magical world picture, but it would be wrong to see this as a 
steady triumph of science over magic.
88
 
Belief in the occult qualities of those plants and animals used in materia 
medica, supposedly based upon past experience anyway, was not affected by this 
increased emphasis upon observation. Furthermore, the tendency of explorers was to 
bring back just those plants which were deemed by native populations to be most 
useful in curing disease. More often than not, European doctors could not decide how, 
or even whether, such unknown drugs worked on the four humours of the body. 
Without so much as an obiter dictum from Aristotle, or Dioscorides, or some other 
ancient authority, it was often impossible to tell whether a plant worked through heat, 
cold or one of the other manifest qualities. Increasingly, therefore, medical thinkers 
declared new drugs to work by means of the alternative to the manifest qualities: 
occult qualities. This even led to a major re-working of medical and therapeutic 
theory, in which some diseases were held to be the result not of an imbalance in the 
humoral constitution, but a corruption of the whole substance of the body. The only 
drugs capable of curing these diseases were those that operated, likewise, on the ‘total 
substance’ of the body, not merely on a particular humor.89  
So, while the occult qualities of materia medica were increasingly recognized 
and accepted into the new natural philosophy, there was a marked rejection of belief 
in the supposed symbolic significance of natural objects. This exclusion of symbolism 
as a factor relevant to the workings of the physical world is a general trend that can be 
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discerned elsewhere in Renaissance and early modern intellectual life. Again, it is 
easy to understand changing attitudes here in terms of a gradual fragmentation. The 
use of amulets or talismans was, of course, a prominent aspect of the magical 
tradition. In his investigation of the Hidden Causes of Things (De abditis rerum 
causis, 1548), Jean Fernel separated amulets which were supposed to work by the 
occult powers of natural objects from those supposed to work by magic spells—the 
power of words, pictures, or other symbols. The former seemed perfectly acceptable. 
Even much later Francis Bacon accepted the use of bloodstone, hung around the neck, 
to prevent nosebleeds. The colour of bloodstone was its signature, revealing that it 
must have an occult but natural power as a styptic.
90
 Fernel and many others, 
however, had severe doubts that words or pictures could have any natural power. 
Although the Roman Catholic Church insisted upon the power of the priest to turn 
bread and wine into the Eucharist by intoning the words of the Mass, this was always 
regarded as a supernatural event. As Johann Wier insisted: “Words are brought forth 
from the mouth of the priest. But they are consecrated by the power and grace of 
God.” When God said “let there be light”, there was light not because it had been said, 
but because God had said it.
91
 
According to the orthodox Christian view, if words or other symbols seemed 
to have any power it must have been due to the secret intervention of demons, 
accomplishing what on-lookers thought the symbols themselves had accomplished. 
As Thomas Aquinas pointed out, words have no power except over intellects. If a 
magician achieves power over inanimate nature by chanting words it must be because 
a demon has intervened, for its own purposes, and is making the magician believe he 
has succeeded.
92
 Within the natural magic tradition, however, there was a belief that 
words did have their own natural power, and so could be used to accomplish natural 
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events or processes. This derived from the suggestion in Genesis 2, 19 that Adam 
named all things. It was assumed that Adam knew the true names of things, names 
which somehow captured the essence or true nature of the things and therefore had 
power over them. To us (and to Thomas) this simply looks like a non sequitur, but it 
seems clear that for many pre-modern thinkers there could be a power linking the 
“real”, God-given, name of a thing to its essence. In this essentially Neoplatonic view, 
language was not just used for communication, but was bound up with knowledge of 
things. If God had given names to things, they would not have been arbitrary signs, 
since God does nothing arbitrarily, and so knowledge of the names constitutes 
knowledge of Creation. 
 The revival of magic in the Renaissance led to increased hopes, therefore, that 
perhaps this Adamic language could be rediscovered, and Adam’s dominion over all 
things, lost at the Fall, could be restored. The major searchers after such ‘universal’ 
languages, therefore, were leading players in the reform of natural philosophy.
93
 In his 
Valerius Terminus of 1603 Francis Bacon expressed his belief that man’s sovereignty 
and power over nature will only be restored “whensoever he shall be able to call the 
creatures by their true names”. By the time he came to write his Great Instauration 
(1620) he was still thinking of restoring “that commerce between the mind of man and 
the nature of things”, but it was clear that he saw this as an exercise in classificatory 
natural history rather than in linguistics. Similarly, the leading light of the Royal 
Society, John Wilkins denied the existence of an Adamic language with a natural 
magical power over things, but held out the hope that a language might be constructed 
which, by being rationally based upon the true nature of things, would prove to be a 
genuinely universal language capable of repairing “the ruins of Babel”.94 The 
distinction is a subtle one. Words in the supposed Adamic language are held to have 
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power over things because they somehow capture the essence of the thing. Words in 
Wilkins’s ‘philosophical language’ capture the essence of the thing by being based on 
(and somehow linguistically reflecting) a sound classificatory scheme which reveals 
the relationships between all things. What is clear is that Wilkins’s language only has 
power over the intellects of its users, not over the objects being discussed. It is equally 
clear, however, that Wilkins’s interest in a universal language first appeared in an 
early work which was undeniably magical in tone: Mercury: Or the secret and swift 
messenger. Shewing how a man may with privacy and speed communicate his 
thoughts to a friend at any distance (1641).  
As in the case of mathematical magic, Wilkins can be seen to have contributed 
to the transformation of universal language schemes from an ambition of the 
magicians to one of natural philosophers. Another important aspect of this story can 
be seen in the Renaissance interest in the Jewish Kabbalah, a mystical system which 
invested words with real power. Christian cabbalism arguably originated with 
Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s Conclusiones philosophicae, cabalasticae et 
theologicae of 1486, but it soon became an important feature of Renaissance magic in 
its own right. In the end, it can be seen that cabbalism was not absorbed into the 
reformed natural philosophies, but this was not through lack of trying. It certainly 
figured in the universal language schemes, even in one of the latest, and potentially 
the greatest, of them, that of G. W. Leibniz. In the end, however, not even Leibniz 
could bring these universal language schemes to fruition and so they failed to find 
their way into the new science.
95
 Nevertheless, historically these schemes can be seen 
as another aspect of the magical tradition which for a while were seriously discussed 
by leading shapers of the new philosophy, as they tried to incorporate what they 
recognized to be useful into their new philosophy. 
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 A similar tale is to be told about the symbolic value of the supposed 
signatures.  We have already noted how compendia of natural history began to 
jettison much of the earlier symbolic paraphernalia that were previously regarded as 
important pieces of information about God’s creatures. As Brian Vickers has shown, 
the doctrine of signatures also began to attract sceptical scrutiny in the early modern 
period. Guy de la Brosse, for example, believed that the supposed resemblances were 
too uncertain, “like clouds, which can be made to look like anything that fantasy can 
project”. John Ray, by contrast, could clearly see the signatures but refused to see any 
meaning in them. He noted that between some plants and various natural or artificial 
objects “so great a similarity exists that no one could fail to recognize it immediately 
nor could he persuade himself that it had ever come about by chance”. Such 
resemblances were, on the one hand, “clear proof of intention on the part of nature” 
(Ray, like all his contemporaries, believed that nature, or God, does nothing in vain). 
On the other hand, as if to contradict this “clear proof”, he suggested that the number 
of similarities was not “so great nor the signatures they bear so obvious and plain to 
everybody that they suggest a pointer or a deliberate plan on the part of Nature.” The 
contradictions in Ray’s account surely reflect a conflict between his belief in natural 
theology, with its assumption that the world is full of examples of God’s design in the 
natural world, together with his religiously-inspired distaste of anything that would 
encourage the practice of magic.
96
 The concept of signatures was not simply 
discarded, it was broken up, and partially incorporated into the new natural 
philosophy, appearing especially in the tradition of natural theology, which sought to 
prove God’s wisdom and beneficence by pointing to seemingly obvious cases of 
intelligent design in nature. 
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Although astrology is now very far beyond the pale as far as most scientists 
are concerned (a few extreme empiricist statisticians notwithstanding), there was a 
time when it was a mainstream subject in the universities, particularly in Medical 
Faculties. What’s more, during the re-drawing of the boundaries around and between 
natural philosophy and magic, there was a time when astrology looked as though it 
might continue to be included even in the new science. Astrology had always attracted 
detractors but the evidence in its favour seemed to override all arguments.
97
 The effect 
of the moon on the tides seemed undeniable and the Sun’s movement through the 
Zodiac defined the seasons. It was also hard to believe that God had placed the myriad 
fixed stars, as well as the Sun, Moon and planets, without having a very good reason 
for doing so. Kepler was in many ways an idiosyncratic thinker but he spoke for many 
devout believers when he insisted that we had to consider God’s reasons: 
For if we do not, we shall be driven to admit that God acted arbitrarily in the 
universe, even though perfectly good rational procedures were open to Him. 
And this is a conclusion I will not accept on anyone’s authority…98 
Even so, Kepler recognised the problems with traditional astrology and jettisoned 
much of its old lore when he came to write his treatise On the more certain 
foundations of astrology (De fundamentis astrologiae certioribus, 1602).
99
  
 Certainty seems to have been an important issue in the fragmentation of 
astrology. The rise in intellectual status of mathematics, which was such an important 
aspect of the mathematiziation of the world picture, depended to a large extent upon 
arguments about the greater certainty of mathematics. So-called judicial astrology was 
an early casualty. Notoriously unreliable, and attracting many cogent arguments 
against its validity, the personal divinatory aspects of astrology were already being 
rejected by the early seventeenth century.
100
 Once again, however, we can see that the 
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story was one of fragmentation, and partial absorption, not wholesale rejection. 
Kepler’s own attempt to establish more certain principles of astrology came to 
nothing, but even at the end of the seventeenth century we can see continuing attempts 
to establish, on empirical grounds, the links between the heavenly movements and the 
weather.
101
 
 For a while it even looked as though Newtonian science, the apogee of 
certainty in mathematical physics, would embrace one major aspect of astrology. As 
Maupertuis wrote, even as late as 1742, “one of the greatest astronomers of the 
century [Newton] has spoken of comets in a manner which re-establishes them in all 
the reputation of terror where once they were”.102 Newton and some of his close 
followers, including the down-to-earth Edmund Halley as well as the more religiously 
fanciful William Whiston, saw comets as God’s way of continuing to adjust and 
reshape the nature of our planetary system. The gravitational pull of a passing comet 
was considered as the likely cause of the Noachian Deluge, since the Almighty prefers 
to make use of “Natural Means to bring about his Will”. Bearing in mind that God 
does nothing in vain, it seemed likely that comets might well be once again, “the 
Instruments of Divine Vengeance”. 103  
 It would be absurd to suppose that Newton and his followers were determined 
to rescue, by hook or by crook, some aspect of astrology. Clearly, they were not. 
Newton’s principle concern was to allow continued discourse about God within 
natural philosophy. For Newton the Cartesian system, which required God only at the 
Creation, after which His intervention in the mechanistic system of the world was 
never required, “was made on purpose to be the foundations of infidelity”.104 
Newton’s belief that God had to continually tinker with his system to keep it running 
smoothly outraged his continental rival, G. W. Leibniz, who was appalled that 
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Newton could imagine God to be such a poor artificer. As far as Newton was 
concerned, however, the use of comets as the natural means by which God winds up 
and replenishes the system allowed him to avoid atheistic interpretations of his 
philosophy, without actually having to suppose direct supernatural interventions by 
God.
105
 Here then we can see the old astrological belief in comets as portents of great 
change, and instruments of God’s wrath, being absorbed for a while into the new 
natural philosophy. By the late eighteenth century, however, thanks to increasing 
secularisation no less than to the increased success of Newtonian mechanics in 
explaining our solar system without recourse to in-puts from comets, even this aspect 
of astrology was excluded from science.
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 Another significant example of the adoption, and adaption, of magical 
thinking concerns the transformation of the magnet from one of the most  occult of 
occult objects to a body with a unique but easily demonstrated power, which could 
even be invoked to explain various non-occult phenomena. A well-known magical 
manuscript on the magnet, written by Pierre de Maricourt in 1269, was first printed in 
1558, when the value of magical works was becoming widely recognised. It must 
have been after reading this that William Gilbert, so-called father of magnetic science, 
hit upon the idea of using magnetism to explain the Copernican rotations of the Earth. 
Magnets are capable of spontaneous movement, Gilbert reasoned, and therefore must 
be endowed with souls, because (according to Aristotle) only creatures with souls are 
capable of self-movement. Using experiments and ideas highly reminiscent of those 
found in Maricourt’s Epistle on the Magnet, Gilbert then went on to show that the 
Earth was a giant magnet, and must have a soul, and be capable of making itself move 
in the ways required by Copernican astronomy.
107
 Subsequent writers, particularly in 
England, recognised the value of Gilbert’s attempt to provide a physical explanation 
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of the Earth’s movement (something which Copernicus never provided), but evidently 
found his emphasis upon a magnetic soul too animistic for their tastes, and focussed 
instead on Gilbert’s talk of a magnetic orbis virtutis, surrounding a planet. Where 
Gilbert had used the magnetic soul to suggest planets moved themselves, later natural 
philosophers, starting with Kepler, developed a dynamic account of planetary 
movements based on tangential motions past the sun and an attractive force towards 
it. Talk of magnetic souls was replaced by talk of ‘magnetic attractions’, ‘magnetic 
virtues’, and eventually ‘attractive principles’ and ‘gravitating powers’; such talk was 
less animistic, but it was not less occult, even though for us it seems definitely more 
‘scientific’.108 The culmination of this trend was the natural philosophical essay by Sir 
William Petty, A new hypothesis of springing or elastique motions (1674), in which 
he actually sought to explain phenomena like elasticity, solidity and fluidity, 
expansion and contraction, and more, by assuming that, just as all planets were 
spherical magnets in Gilbert’s cosmological scheme, so all atoms are spherical 
magnets. Although magnetic attractions and repulsions continue to be occult qualities, 
magnetic phenomena can be clearly and easily demonstrated on a laboratory 
workbench, and so magnets can be used to provide legitimate explanations in natural 
philosophy.
109
 
 There were even some thinkers, although mostly on the fringes of natural 
philosophy, who tried to absorb demonology into the new natural philosophy. Henry 
More, the Cambridge Platonist divine who introduced the teaching of Cartesianism 
into Cambridge, Joseph Glanvill, FRS and apologist for the new philosophy; and even 
for a while Robert Boyle, were keen to make the study of demons, witchcraft, and 
ghosts an important part of the new experimental philosophy. The motivation was 
perfectly clear: to combat the up-take of Cartesian and other versions of the 
John Henry  Page 48 of 80 
mechanical philosophy by irreligious thinkers who were seeking to promote an 
entirely materialist worldview. The would-be experimentalist demonologists wanted 
to demonstrate that there were phenomena which could not be explained in terms of 
the mechanical philosophy, and so immaterial beings and immaterial principles had to 
be acknowledged.
110
 
 
I believe it would be possible to continue in this vein, showing how different aspects 
of the magical tradition were partially taken up by natural philosophers, while other 
aspects were entirely excluded. In all cases, as with the examples briefly discussed 
here, the story will be one where the historical complexities derive from a host of 
contingencies. It is fairly obvious, for example, that the precise way in which 
alchemy, or part of it, became absorbed into natural philosophy was different from the 
way that so-called ‘mathematical magic’—the use of machinery to improve human 
faculties—was adopted.111 Furthermore, some prominent aspects of the natural magic 
tradition, such as a belief in the natural power of words, were not included within the 
new boundaries at all. In other cases, aspects of the tradition were only taken up in a 
very restricted sense, as in the case of numerology, which seems to have led Kepler 
and Newton to draw specific conclusions about the natural world, but can hardly be 
said to have been a general influence.
112
 If we bear in mind, also, that the magical 
tradition was undoubtedly a major source for the experimentalism of the new 
philosophies, and for the idea that knowledge of the natural world should be useful for 
the benefit of mankind, it seems hard to deny the claim that the new philosophies 
were greatly indebted to the magical tradition.
113
 
 
Why the Change? 
John Henry  Page 49 of 80 
The question arises, therefore, as to why this sea-change occurred. Why was the map 
of knowledge redrawn between the end of the Renaissance and the beginning of the 
Enlightenment? Why were the boundaries redefined so that natural magic lost its 
identity by becoming largely absorbed into the new ‘natural philosophy’ (which now, 
thanks to the experimental method, the integral use of mathematics, and the concern 
with pragmatism was closer to our modern concept of science than it was to the earlier 
tradition of contemplative natural philosophy), while symbolic magic came to be seen, 
by the educated at least, as superstitious nonsense,
114
 and demonology, formerly a 
borderline category linking religion and natural philosophy, became first of all an 
entirely religious category, and with increasing secularization was thoroughly 
rejected?
115
 
 As with so many other problems in history, the answers to this question are no 
doubt legion. We have already considered a few reasons along the way, such as the 
change in status of mathematics, helped by the discovery of the supposedly 
Aristotelian Quaestiones mechanicae, but it is beyond the scope of this article to 
survey all the other possible factors. It is clear, for example, that the full story could 
not be told without paying careful attention to the social and political context of 
Renaissance and Reformation Europe, and how developments in these spheres 
affected intellectual life.
116
 What I want to do here is simply to consider briefly some 
of the more immediate reasons why the boundaries of magic and natural philosophy 
were redrawn in just the way they were. By ‘immediate’ I mean those reasons which 
arose directly out of the efforts of Renaissance and early modern thinkers to improve 
their understanding of the natural world.  
 Perhaps the first thing to mention in this connection was the change in the 
intellectual status of magic as a result of the discovery of the essentially religious 
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writings attributed to Hermes Trismegistus. Thanks to a generally accepted belief in 
the wisdom of Adam, it was usually assumed in the pre-modern period that 
knowledge was something that needed to be recovered from the past. Adam knew all 
things, but thanks to the Fall, this wisdom had been successively forgotten. For the 
pre-moderns, therefore, thinkers of great antiquity were more likely to know more—to 
have forgotten less of the Adamic wisdom—than a contemporary thinker. This belief 
is most familiar to historians of science through the common designation of the 
Copernican theory as the Pythagorean theory.
117
 The Copernicans knew that if they 
were to have any chance of persuading their contemporaries of the truth of the 
Copernican theory they had to show that it had been believed in the past. The ancient 
sage, Hermes Trismegistus, was regarded as a contemporary of Moses, and he was 
seen to be responsible for transmitting the Adamic wisdom to the pagan Greeks, as 
Moses had transmitted it to the Jews. This belief was easy to sustain in the light of the 
fact that the newly discovered Hermetic writings showed clear foreshadowings of 
Christian belief, including its trinitarianism. As we now know, these supposed 
foreshadowings were in fact echoes of Christian belief, since these writings were 
actually compiled by Neoplatonists in the early centuries of the Christian era.  
 The first translator of the Hermetic Corpus (a substantial part of it, at least) 
was Marsilio Ficino who was clearly fascinated by Neoplatonic theurgical beliefs and 
who began to develop his own theory of what D. P. Walker called ‘spiritual magic’ in 
his De vita coelitus comparanda (1489). Ficino’s work proved immensely influential 
and helped to promote the view that Hermes Trismegistus was above all else a 
magician.
 118
 This identification of Hermes as a magus was helped by the fact that, as 
well as the Neoplatonic theistic writings attributed to him, there were also a 
considerable number of astrological, alchemical and natural magical texts also 
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attributed to this great sage. Given the belief in Adamic wisdom, and the belief in the 
great antiquity of the Hermetic writings, magic came to be seen as one of the oldest 
forms of knowledge, and was therefore newly invested with great respectability. After 
centuries of being disparaged by the Church, magic came to be seen as a major aspect 
of Adamic wisdom. Accordingly, as Eugenio Garin has suggested, there was a brief 
time, shortly after the discovery of the Hermetic Corpus, when it was acceptable to be 
called a magus, and to acknowledge oneself to be a magus (remember, we have 
already seen that it was much more usual to deny that one was a magician).
119
 It is 
hardly surprising therefore that reforming natural philosophers of the Renaissance and 
early modern periods should look with fresh eyes at the magical tradition, and 
consider more seriously than before what it had to offer.
120
 
 Another reason why the boundaries of magic came to be redrawn arose from 
rapid developments in the understanding of earlier magical traditions as a result of the 
humanist scholarship of the Renaissance. In particular, the recovery of the works of 
Ancient Neoplatonists, such as Plotinus, Proclus, Iamblichus and others, revealed a 
theory of magic in which “spiritual and demonic magic” played a greater role than 
natural magic. This alternative to the Aristotelian tradition first became known as a 
result of the work of the famous Florentine philosopher and translator, Marsilio 
Ficino, whose De vita coelitus comparanda of 1489 was a full exposition of the 
theory of magic which drew not only upon Aristotelian traditions of occult qualities 
but also upon the more theurgical theorising of the later Neoplatonists. Although 
Ficino himself seems to have managed to stay within the confines of natural magic as 
it was traditionally conceived (with the emphasis on the natural), his exposition drew 
attention to the fact that later Neoplatonists seemed to believe that occult qualities in 
matter were clear signs of divine or demonic presence within the matter. For the 
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pagan Neoplatonists, in other words, the occult but natural effects discussed in 
traditional natural magic were, in fact, supernatural effects brought about directly by 
gods or demons. Although such ideas were pagan and could easily be shown not to fit 
in with Christian Aristotelianism, they ensured that the boundary demarcation 
between natural and supernatural and the abilities of demons were placed firmly on 
the agenda of scholarly discussions. In this way, occult qualities, formerly hardly 
discussed within the scholastic tradition, became important items for discussion.
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 One of the most important of such discussions was that of the notorious 
secular Aristotelian philosopher, Pietro Pomponazzi. Pomponazzi was, as Brian 
Copenhaver has recently said, “entirely and aggressively naturalist” and in 1520 he 
wrote a treatise On the causes of marvelous natural effects and on spells, in which he 
explicitly intended to make demons redundant for any understanding of the natural 
world. One of his arguments was that, even if demons were capable of knowing better 
than men all the occult qualities of things and how to accomplish things by bringing 
together sympathetic actives and passives, because demons were spiritual, 
incorporeal, beings they were completely incapable of manipulating matter to 
accomplish anything by their knowledge.
122
 Once again, Pomponazzi's book, like 
Ficino's, stimulated debate about occult qualities, demons, and the demarcations 
between and around them. By rejecting the possibility of demonic intervention, 
Pomponazzi greatly expanded the role of the supposed occult qualities of matter. Such 
qualities could stimulate thinking about the nature of matter itself, and could 
subsequently be absorbed into the new natural philosophy. Meanwhile, sceptical 
philosophers had a new set of arguments for dismissing demons as ineffectual, and 
ultimately as nothing more than the result of superstitious beliefs.
123
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 Another important stimulus towards a new and detailed consideration of occult 
qualities arose out of university medical faculties. We have already noted that 
developments in botany and other subjects affiliated to the production of materia 
medica resulted in increased numbers of new drugs being designated as “occult” in 
their operation, because their efficacy did not depend upon their effects upon the 
manifest qualities of the patients’ humours. This coincided with awareness of the need 
for reform of medical theory from another quarter. The increased prevalence of 
pestilential diseases in a Europe where bubonic plague was endemic and where 
syphilis was cutting a swathe through all classes of society presented problems for 
traditional medical theory. Galen saw all disease in terms of a disturbance of the four 
humours such that the normal healthy temperament (the balance of the humours in the 
body) was disrupted. It follows from this that diseases do not have a separate 
existence in their own right. The difficulty with this individualistic physiological 
approach to sickness, seeing every illness as the special problem of one patient, is that 
it cannot easily explain conditions which seem to be infectious. Why should one 
patient’s physiological disruption be capable in some cases of being passed on to 
others with different constitutions or temperaments? The difficulty is especially 
severe for Galenic theory in the case of epidemic diseases, such as plague. Epidemic 
pestilences strongly suggest, contrary to ancient authority, that diseases have a kind of 
life of their own; they are real, distinct entities, which can pass from one person to 
another, or can simultaneously attack great numbers of people irrespective of their 
individual temperaments. A new understanding of the nature of diseases demands new 
ways of dealing with them, and the sixteenth century saw three major attempts to 
reform medical theory. The three would-be reformers, Paracelsus, Girolamo 
Fracastoro and Jean Fernel all drew upon occult traditions in their suggested reforms. 
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Paracelsus looked to alchemy, not just as a way of producing new medicines, but as a 
way of understanding the nature of the physiology, and the nature of disease. 
Fracastoro developed the idea of “seeds” of disease, seminal principles capable of 
growing in the body and disrupting it, while Fernel believed that pestilences acted not 
on the humours, but on the substantial form of the body, which Fernel called the “total 
substance” of the body, and they did so, not by affecting the manifest qualities but by 
means of some occult power over the total substance.
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 The works of Ficino, Pomponazzi, Paracelsus, Fracastoro, and Fernel 
are, of course, just salient points in a rapidly changing landscape of intellectual 
discussion. Throughout the sixteenth century the nature and the role of occult qualities 
become increasingly prominent in natural philosophizing. This was bound to have 
unfortunate repercussions for traditional Aristotelianism, since, although occult 
qualities were allowed for in scholasticism, and traditional natural magic throughout 
the Middle Ages was loosely premised upon Aristotelian assumptions (alchemy, for 
example, although going far beyond anything to be found in Aristotle's writings still 
assumed the truth of the four elements and four qualities), in fact there was very little 
in Aristotle himself about occult qualities.
125
 Indeed, it became increasingly obvious 
during the Renaissance, when Aristotle came to be studied in the original Greek, that 
the natural magic tradition owed a great deal to medieval and Arabic interpolations, 
for example, from Thomas Aquinas, Albertus Magnus, Avicenna, and Alkindi.
126
 
More to the point, the ideal of science in the Aristotelian tradition was based on the 
form of the logical syllogism (deductive reasoning), but the premises, the starting 
points upon which the reasoning was based, had to be uncontentious, evident truths to 
which all could freely assent. Small wonder, therefore, that the main emphasis in 
natural philosophical argument was on the supposedly manifest qualities, which could 
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fulfill the criteria of being undeniable and evident to all.
127
 It was one thing, within 
this system to occasionally have to resort to occult qualities in one's explanations; it 
was quite another, however, to see occult qualities playing an increasingly prominent 
role in a widespread range of natural phenomena. There was a real crisis in 
Aristotelianism, therefore, concerning the very possibility of dealing with insensible 
properties and entities in a philosophy that was supposedly grounded on human 
sensation. When writers like Pomponazzi, Jean Fernel, and Daniel Sennert can be 
seen to be elevating the role of occult qualities in Aristotelianism it seems legitimate 
to ask whether they are best seen as eclectic Aristotelians or as contributors to the 
demise of Aristotelianism. Whatever the truth of that, we cannot help but conclude, I 
think, that Renaissance developments in the notion of occult qualities resulted in a 
major re-arrangement, in which these qualities came to play a much greater role in 
reformed versions of natural philosophy, and eventually became absorbed into the 
mainstream of the new philosophies which completely displaced Aristotelianism.
128
 
Further difficulty for Aristotelian natural philosophy was caused by emerging 
problems with the theory of substantial forms. These arose especially as a result of 
considering the nature of what we would call chemical compounds, compared with 
mere mixtures, and why new substantial forms seem to be created in the one case, but 
not in the other. Just as the medical reformers turned to the occult to develop new 
theories of medicine, so innovative scholastics and anti-Aristotelians alike turned to 
alchemy to help understand the production of new substances. At the leading edge of 
this work, as performed by alchemists like Daniel Sennert and Robert Boyle, the 
notion that the substantial form defined a body became untenable when it was realized 
that the original constituents of a mixt (what we would call a chemical compound) 
could be recovered. According to scholastic theory this required the recreation of the 
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constituents’ substantial forms after they had been replaced by the new substantial 
form of the mixt. Alternative explanations in terms of the conjunction of unchanging 
atoms or corpuscles began to replace Aristotelian accounts but these explanations, as 
William R. Newman has shown, owed more to alchemical theorizing than they did to 
the emerging mechanical philosophy.
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 Finally, unlikely as it may seem to us (or to those of us who remain, like 
David Brewster, recalcitrant in their belief that all magic was merely the production of 
knaves and fools), there is every reason to suppose that, as far as Renaissance thinkers 
were concerned, the occult sciences were the most likely source for the reform of 
natural philosophy, and for the establishment of a true understanding of God’s 
Creation.  Indeed, to a large extent they were the only alternative sources of natural 
knowledge.  
It has been suggested by Brian Vickers that modern science emerged as the 
scientific mentality overcame the occult mentality that had been dominant among 
earlier thinkers. The assumption here is that Paracelsus, say, representing the occult 
mentality, chose the wrong path to reform natural knowledge, while Descartes, 
representing the scientific mentality, chose the right path.
130
 In a sense, of course, this 
is true—Cartesianism has proved more influential on subsequent scientific thinking 
than Paracelsianism, but we cannot infer from this that Descartes was more scientific 
in his thinking than Paracelsus, unless we choose to make it a matter of our definitions 
of who is a scientific thinker and who is not. Relying on our perfect hindsight we can 
easily declare Descartes to be a more scientific thinker than Paracelsus, but at the time 
of Descartes’s death in 1650 judgments as to the relative merits of these two thinkers 
could not have been couched in these terms.  
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Furthermore, for the sake of the argument being presented here, Paracelsus is 
by no means the best representative of magical thinking to choose. His thinking seems 
to be at best confused and at worst willfully obscure, and was clearly recognized as 
such by many contemporaries. But not every thinker in the occult tradition was as 
poor a communicator (or as weak a thinker, if that was his problem) as Paracelsus. 
Many, on the contrary, must be counted among the greatest thinkers of their age, and 
they believed, like Descartes, that they had discovered the key to understanding, and 
explaining natural phenomena. Although Jean Fernel chose very deliberately to argue 
for the increased importance of occult qualities in natural philosophy and in the theory 
and practice of medicine, he did so in accordance with the best canons of logic and 
rhetoric of the day, and by marshalling powerful evidence and argument in support of 
his views. To dismiss Fernel as a man with an “occult mentality”, with implications of 
wooly-minded inconsequentiality if not downright irrationality, would be entirely 
unjust. The same is true, for the most part, of other thinkers in the magical tradition. 
Girolamo Cardano, and Cornelius Agrippa, to mention but two, should be recognized 
as leading shapers of European thought, not simply dismissed as deluded contributors 
to a worthless pseudo-intellectual tradition.  
This is not to say that all magicians should ipso facto be honoured as great 
thinkers. We need to exercise the same care in making judgments about the historical 
significance of these thinkers as we would in the case of those who are supposed 
contributors to the history of science. Lauren Kassell has recently shown that the 
London-based astrologer Simon Forman, was an autodidact who was barely capable 
of understanding the tradition he wished to exploit for his own personal gain. If we 
wish to understand how practitioners in the occult tradition, even more than medical 
practitioners, came to be seen as frauds and charlatans, we could start with Forman. 
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Similarly, the historical significance of Robert Fludd has not yet been established 
beyond doubt, in spite of sympathetic treatments of his work by a number of 
scholars.
131
 
The leading thinkers in the magical tradition, at any rate, should be seen as 
thinkers who were trying to find solutions to problems which the Aristotelian and 
Galenic traditions could not resolve, and who turned to the occult, not because they 
were befuddled fools with an occult mentality, but quite simply because occult 
traditions seemed to offer the most likely source of help. When the Aristotelian theory 
of substantial forms, and the associated hylomorphic matter theory began increasingly 
to seem inadequate, natural philosophers turned to alchemy as a likely pointer to 
alternative ways of understanding the relationship between bodies and their 
properties.
132
 When Galenic medical theory, which relied almost exclusively on the 
balance (or imbalance) of the four qualities in the body for understanding disease and 
treating it, came to be seen as increasingly inadequate, medical reformers like Fernel, 
Fracastoro, and the Paracelsians, all turned in one way or another to occult qualities as 
an alternative.
133
 Similarly, every one of the Renaissance thinkers who tried to 
develop new systems of philosophy, intended to completely replace Aristotelianism, 
relied to a large extent on aspects of the magical tradition. So much so, in fact, that 
each of these system-builders, can be seen as contributors themselves to the magical 
tradition. The title of Girolamo Fracastoro’s De sympathía et antipathia rerum (1550) 
reveals its magical nature, but Girolamo Cardano’s more cryptically titled De 
subtilitate (1554), which includes a substantial book “On Marvels, and the way to 
represent diverse things beyond belief”, is equally indebted to the occult tradition.134 
Bernardino Telesio’s De rerum natura iuxta propria principia (1587) assumes that all 
things are sentient and relies heavily on ideas of spirit which derive from the earlier 
John Henry  Page 59 of 80 
magical philosophy of Ficino. Furthermore, Telesio was a major influence on at least 
two other thinkers who were indebted to the magical tradition, Tommaso Campanella, 
author of De sensu rerum et magia (1620) and other magical works, and Francis 
Bacon, whose own system of philosophy, combined Telesian ideas on spirit with 
alchemical ideas to make what has been described as a semi-Paracelsian 
cosmology.
135
 The inventive group of Italian system-building “nature philosophers”, 
as they are usually known, also included Francesco Patrizi, Giordano Bruno. The 
magical nature of Bruno’s world-view is so well known that it can be taken for 
granted, but Patrizi’s views are indicated, if not by the title of his great system, Nova 
de universis philosophia (1593) then by the fact that he published it alongside his own 
translation of Chaldean and Hermetic works, under the title Magia philosophia 
(1593).
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This situation, in which would-be reformers of natural philosophy turned to 
the occult tradition as the most likely way out of all difficulties, continued even late 
into the seventeenth century, to the period seen as witnessing the dramatic decline of 
magic. Robert Boyle, recognizing the inadequacy of strict versions of the mechanical 
philosophy, including Cartesian claims that there were no new motions generated in 
nature, only transfers of motion from one part of the system to another via collisions, 
turned once again, as the opponents of Aristotelianism had before him, to alchemy. 
Newton, recognizing the absurdity of Cartesian vortex theory as an explanation for 
planetary movements and for gravity, preferred to rely instead upon the assumption 
that bodies could attract one another across empty space.  
The example set by Newton makes it hard to deny that, if reformers of natural 
philosophy believed the occult sciences offered the most likely source for a viable 
alternative to Aristotelianism, they were right. Descartes was proud of the fact that he 
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had eschewed all occult qualities from his system, and so in a sense believed he had 
succeeded where Aristotelianism had failed (since it had never quite managed to 
dispose of occult qualities). But for many, the Cartesian system could be seen to be 
ultimately unworkable, and rather than eschewing occult qualities, they embraced 
them as the only realistic alternative.
137
 In so doing, occult qualities became absorbed 
into mainstream reformed natural philosophy. The triumph of Newtonianism, then, 
with its basic premise that all phenomena could be explained in terms of attractive and 
repulsive particles capable of acting at a distance, showed not only that Newton was 
right, but that earlier would-be reformers of natural philosophy who had tried to draw 
upon the magical tradition were not too far wrong. 
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